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The	East	Coast	franchise	debacle:	only	the	latest
problem	arising	from	rail	privatisation
Robert	Jupe	provides	a	history	of	the	East	Coast	Main	Line	franchise	and	examines	its	latest
problems.	He	concludes	that	the	current	debacle	illustrates	how	privatisation,	far	from	improving
efficiency,	has	fragmented	an	integrated	industry	into	many	constituent	parts,	and	an	alternative
approach	is	now	necessary.
The	Conservative	Government	announced	on	16	May	that	the	East	Coast	franchise	will	be	temporarily
renationalised,	after	its	operators	could	no	longer	meet	the	payments	promised	in	their	contract.	Franchise	bidding
was	a	key	element	of	rail	privatisation	introduced	by	the	Major	Government	in	the	1990s.	It	was	intended	to	improve
services,	and	reduce	subsidy,	by	attracting	new	entrants	into	the	rail	industry.	Bidders	are	required	to	offer	premium
payments	to	government	on	the	profitable	franchise	routes,	or	to	bid	to	operate	at	minimum	subsidy	on	the	loss-
making	routes.
In	practice,	there	are	only	a	small	number	of	bidders	for	each	franchise,	and	there	have	been	frequent	problems	with
operators	winning	franchises	on	the	basis	of	overoptimistic	bids.	This	has	now	happened	three	times	on	the	East
Coast	Main	Line	franchise.
Originally,	the	franchise	was	awarded	to	GNER	in	2005	after	it	agreed	to	a	premium	payment	of	£1.3	billion	over	10
years,	assuming	annual	revenue	increases	of	9%.	It	abandoned	the	contract,	however,	when	passenger	numbers
failed	to	materialise,	and	its	parent,	Sea	Containers,	faced	bankruptcy.	The	replacement	operator,	National	Express,
contracted	in	2007	to	pay	an	even	higher	premium	of	£1.4	billion	over	seven	years.	But	in	2009,	the	company	was
faced	with	a	revenue	growth	of	only	0.3%	in	the	first	quarter	of	the	year,	and	with	the	need	to	renegotiate	terms	on	its
£1.2	billion	debt.
After	National	Express	abandoned	the	contract,	the	franchise	was	renationalised	in	2009	by	the	Labour	Government
which	established	Directly	Operated	Railways	to	manage	the	line	under	public	ownership.	Despite	infrastructure
problems,	there	were	improved	levels	of	customer	satisfaction	and	punctuality.	Further,	the	state-owned	operator,
which	did	not	have	to	pay	dividends	to	shareholders,	was	more	financially	successful	than	its	private	sector
counterparts	–	before	or	since	–	and	managed	to	return	£1	billion	in	premium	payments	to	the	government.
Despite	its	successful	operation	under	public	ownership,	the	East	Coast	franchise	was	re-privatised	by	the
Conservative-led	Coalition	Government	on	ideological	grounds	in	2015	on	the	eve	of	the	general	election.	Its	new
operators,	Stagecoach	and	Virgin,	with	operating	company	shares	of	90%	and	10%	respectively,	bid	£3.3	billion	for
an	eight-year	franchise,	far	more	than	in	the	previous	two	failed	bids.	The	predicted	revenue	growth	again	failed	to
materialise,	however,	and	after	Stagecoach	had	lost	around	£200	million	of	its	own	funds	and	breached	a	financial
covenant,	Transport	Secretary	Chris	Grayling	renationalised	the	franchise	until	2020.	Ending	the	franchise	will	allow
the	operators	to	avoid	around	£2	billion	in	payments	up	to	2023,	and	they	will	further	benefit	by	not	suffering	any
penalties	in	future	bidding	competitions	for	rail	franchises.	By	2020,	the	franchise	is	meant	to	be	converted	into	a
public-private	partnership,	but	details	of	how	this	would	operate	are	not	yet	clear.
The	East	Coast	franchise	debacle	is	only	the	latest	in	the	many	problems	arising	from	rail	privatisation.	With	rail
privatisation,	it	was	argued	that	the	introduction	of	competition	and	private	sector	management	would,	in	the	long	run,
improve	efficiency,	reduce	costs,	eliminate	subsidy,	reduce	the	need	for	government	intervention	and	provide	better
services	for	passengers.	In	practice,	rail	costs	have	doubled	in	real	terms	under	privatisation,	the	current	rail	subsidy
of	£4	billion	(net	of	premium	payments)	is	several	times	the	annual	subsidy	received	by	the	much-maligned	British
Rail	in	the	years	before	privatisation,	and	passengers	in	franchises	such	as	Southern	have	suffered	from	many
delays	and	disruptions.
Although	still	subject	to	jibes	about	its	sandwiches,	British	Rail	in	the	decade	before	privatisation	undertook	a	long
and	painful	business-focused	reorganisation	which	left	it	one	of	the	most	efficient	railways	in	Europe.	Ironically,	this
reorganisation	was	only	completed	in	1992,	the	year	the	Conservative	Government’s	rail	privatisation	proposals	were
published.
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Privatisation,	far	from	improving	efficiency,	fragmented	an	integrated	industry	into	many	constituent	parts:	an
infrastructure	provider	(now	Network	Rail,	which	is	in	the	public	sector	and	replaced	the	failed	Railtrack);	franchised
train	operating	companies;	and	rolling	stock	companies	which	lease	trains	to	the	operating	companies.
A	key	reason	for	franchising	is	the	continuing	attempt	by	government	to	obtain	high	premium	payments	from
operators	on	the	most	profitable	routes,	meaning	that	there	is	an	ongoing	problem	of	overoptimistic	bidding	and
passengers	are	faced	with	significant	annual	fare	increases.	Hence,	the	feature	of	ebullient	bidding	is	not	confined	to
the	East	Coast	franchise.	For	example,	currently	two	other	operators,	Greater	Anglia	and	Transpenine	Express,	are
said	by	financial	analysts	to	be	facing	problems	because	of	optimistic	forecasts.	The	rail	franchising	sector	was
supposed	to	unleash	the	benefits	of	competition	and	private	enterprise,	but	it	is	now	dominated	by	subsidiaries	of
three	state-owned	railways	–	those	of	France,	Germany	and	the	Netherlands	–	which	benefit	from	British	government
subsidy.
The	fundamental	problem	with	financing	rail	is	that,	as	a	highly	capital-intensive	industry,	it	is	very	difficult	to	cover
the	costs	of	both	the	infrastructure	and	train	operations	from	fares.	This	dilemma	has	been	critical	for	rail	under	both
private	and	public	ownership.	British	Rail	came	closest	to	resolving	the	dilemma	before	its	privatisation	by
undertaking	major	organisational	reforms	which	resulted	in	very	significant	improvements	in	productivity	and
punctuality.
An	alternative	approach	to	the	privatisation	model	would	be	to	bring	franchises	back	into	the	public	sector	at	no	cost
as	they	expire,	or	as	operators	run	into	financial	difficulty	or	contract	breaches,	and	merge	them	with	Network	Rail.
The	industry	could	then	be	gradually	reintegrated,	and	substantial	savings	made	as	dividends	would	not	be	paid	to
shareholders	and	the	costs	relating	to	fragmentation	would	be	reduced.	Further,	responsibility	for	rail	could	be
transferred	from	the	Department	for	Transport	to	the	new,	publicly-owned	rail	body.	The	ultimate	paradox	of	the
flawed	privatisation	of	rail	is	that	it	has	led,	because	of	all	the	problems	which	have	arisen,	to	far	more	State
intervention	in	rail	than	when	British	Rail	was	responsible	for	operating	the	whole	railway.
_________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	published	research	(with	Warwick	Funnell)	in	Business	History.
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